This book chapter discusses the background to the UK General Anti-Avoidance Rule, analyses the wording of the legislation and looks at its relationship with double taxation treaties and EU and OECD developments
Introduction
For many years the UK has been an outlier in a world of statutory general anti-avoidance rules (GAARS). Despite having been instrumental in the enactment of GAARs in many of its former colonies, it had not had not seen the need to introduce any such legislation in the UK itself. In addition, for a long time the judicial approach to statutory interpretation in tax cases was a somewhat literal one.
During the 19980's, this literal approach was relaxed to some extent, especially in cases which involved circular schemes, and it was thought that the UK courts were creating a judicial anti-avoidance doctrine or approach, sometimes known as the Ramsay approach after the case in which it was originally enunciated. 2 The so called 'new approach' did at first appear to be a success in creating a deterrent to the more artificial forms of tax avoidance schemes that had been marketed prior to the Ramsay decision, but subsequent decisions arguably reduced the doctrine to a rule of statutory interpretation that resulted in uncertainty and was sometimes ineffective. Following criticism and concerns about inconsistency and unpredictability, the UK finally introduced a type of statutory GAAR in the Finance Act 2013 (FA 13). The report that proposed this development is known as the Aaronson Report after its author, Graham Aaronson QC. 3 The Aaronson Report rejected the appellation 'avoidance'
and instead called the rule a "general anti-abuse rule". Conveniently, this is also a GAAR and for the purposes of this chapter, the term GAAR will be used to embrace both a general antiavoidance rule and anti-abuse rules in the sense used in the UK statute unless otherwise stated. The supposed difference between the two will be discussed below, but the chapter proceeds on the basis that "avoidance" in the extended sense in which that word is now being used in the media and political discussion is almost impossible to define so as to give a viable operational rule. The UK GAAR, therefore, covers a defined area of egregious abuse and not everything that might be described as avoidance in recent popular discourse.
The UK GAAR and the BEPS Action Plan
The introduction of a GAAR in the UK was under discussion well before the OECD's Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) report was commissioned and published (as will be shown below), but in the minds of politicians, the press and some commentators, the two developments have tended to become conflated. As a result there has been criticism of the UK GAAR by some commentators because it does not prevent profit shifting and base erosion of the type being discussed at the OECD in the context of BEPS. The answer to this criticism is that a GAAR cannot solve underlying structural issues of the type being tackled at an international level. It was never suggested by its proponents that it could. That means that it is limited in scope, but it may nevertheless be a valuable tool for the taxing authority, provided its role is properly understood.
Given that it is very new and was finely balanced, it is highly unlikely that the wording of the UK GAAR would be changed as a result of the BEPS Action Plan or any of the ensuing reports.
Development of the judicial 'Ramsay' principle into a rule of statutory interpretation
An early UK view on interpretation in tax cases, which lasted throughout much of the 20 th century, can be found in the This position became problematic as more tax schemes were built on the foundations of this approach and by the 1970s an intensive tax avoidance industry had grown up, selling highly artificial "off the shelf" schemes, which often involved money going round in circles. The courts began to change their approach in a series of cases, notably a decision of the UK's highest court at that time, the House of Lords, in the case if W.T. Ramsay v. IRC. 5 The decision in this case was known as the "the new approach". This was elaborated in subsequent case law, which took various twists and turns. Initially, the case law appeared to be creating a judicial rule that: where there was a pre-ordained series of transactions with inserted steps with no commercial purpose other than the avoidance of tax and no practical likelihood that the events would not take place in the order ordained, the courts could view the scheme as a whole and tax on the basis of the overall result.
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This position began to be strained, however. Taxpayers started to rely on the precise wording of the so-called judicial rule as if it were a legislative rule and argued that not all the conditions were satisfied for the rule to apply. Taxpayers won some important cases on the their approach and assert that there was not, and never had been, a judicial rule. Arguably this goes beyond a normal rule of statutory interpretation, but this is debated.
In some cases, the judiciary take this to be an invitation to apply a purposive form of construction and even to reach a result which may involve some stretching of the wording.
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In other cases, where they find it hard to discern a clear purpose to which to give effect, and particularly where a detailed statutory code applies, the courts find in favour of the taxpayer. 11 The simple fact that a scheme is tax motivated is not sufficient to bring it within this special principle of statutory interpretation if the words themselves do not permit this.
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Whilst this judicial approach has been used to combat some forms of tax avoidance, it is uncertain and not wholly reliable. It depends upon a sympathetic court being prepared to stretch the wording of legislation to its limits.
There is no general concept of abuse of rights in the UK. 13 The use of purposive interpretation has been developing in non tax areas of the law for longer than it has in tax law and increasingly so as a result of the influence of cases decided by the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJ). There is now no reason to suppose that interpretation in tax cases should be out of line with this development: the question is whether the so-called this author it should be the former, but the desire of some of the judges to combat tax avoidance sometimes converts it into something more. This is not, however, a consistent application, so something more is needed to deal with the most extreme forms of abuse of tax legislation.
Introduction of a statutory GAAR
The UK tax system has a considerable volume of specific anti-avoidance legislation. It is one of the longest sets of tax legislation in the world and is very detailed in nature, being rule based rather than building on principles. The system contains both very specific provisions and what have come to be known as TAARS or 'targeted anti-avoidance rules. These TAARs relates to particular areas of law but may be quite wide and general within that area.
Examples are considered below. Despite this, the detailed rules in the tax legislation have led to considerable amount of 'creative compliance' 14 using those rules and, as described above, the courts have not been able to stop this due to the very specific nature of such rules.
A proposal was put forward in 1998 to introduce a statutory GAAR, but this was rejected after some discussion. 15 Partly this was because no wording could be agreed that was as flexible and acceptable as the judicial language, and partly because it was considered by the representatives of taxpayers that an advance clearance procedure was essential, whereas the revenue authority did not consider it had the resources to provide such a service, nor did it wish to do so as a matter of principle. The view was that scarce revenue authority staff should not spend their time advising taxpayers attempting to implement schemes.
Nevertheless, there continued to be considerable concern in the UK at the perceived number of highly complex artificial and often aggressive tax schemes being carried out. Whilst the UK has extensive advance disclosure provisions as discussed below, the disclosed schemes also more fundamental and familiar criticisms, suggesting on the one hand that GAARs create uncertainty and that the reliance on guidance is undesirable and on the other that this moderate GAAR did not go far enough. 19 The consultation period included an important phase during which an interim GAAR Panel was set up to advise and approve extensive extra-statutory guidance.
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The Government introduced the GAAR in the FA 13 and it came into force in July 2013. 21 It applies only to tax arrangements entered into on or after the day on which the FA13 was passed. Thus the UK GAAR has no retrospective effect which is an important feature in terms of the rule of law, but one which means that there is little likelihood of litigation on the provisions in the near future.
The UK GAAR applies to income tax; corporation tax; capital gains tax; petroleum revenue tax; inheritance tax; stamp duty land tax, and the new annual tax on enveloped dwellings and it was extended to social security contributions by the National Insurance Contributions Act 2014, but it does not apply to VAT. VAT has been left to be dealt with under the case law being evolved by the CJ in the Halifax case and those that have followed. 22 The rationale for this was to ensure that there would not be conflicting law applying to any transaction. 23 The UK GAAR is considered to be more clearly targeted than the Halifax principle. It was suggested in some quarters that one single rule would be preferable; indeed some in the UK were arguing strongly for the use of the Halifax principle 24 as a universal GAAR for tax in 19 See, for example, P. As explained above, the UK GAAR has been designed to be a moderate, targeted GAAR.
What follows is taken from the legislation and the published guidance (the Guidance). There have been no cases taken to the courts on the basis of the GAAR as yet, given how new the legislation is and the fact that it is not retrospective, so any examples, even those given in the Guidance are, to a degree, speculative.
Definitions and the double reasonableness test
The moderate targeted approach can be seen in the "double reasonableness test" which forms the centre piece of the UK GAAR legislation. The structure of the provision is logical if a little cumbersome. It is necessary to work through this step by step to appreciate the nature of the proviso.
Section 209, FA 13 provides that if there are tax arrangements that are abusive, the tax advantages that would arise from the arrangements are to be counteracted by the making of adjustments. Arrangements are "tax arrangements" if, having regard to all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to conclude that the obtaining of a tax advantage was the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements. 27 The words 'it would be reasonable to conclude' show that the main purpose test is an objective one. 28  the arrangements result in a claim for the repayment or crediting of tax (including foreign tax) that has not been, and is unlikely to be, paid.
Each case is subject to the qualification that arrangements are abusive "only if it is reasonable to assume that such a result was not the anticipated result when the relevant tax provisions were enacted". 31 So economic substance might be relevant as a factor that could override form, but in limited circumstances; not a general rule. We might even call this a triple reasonableness test.
Rules of evidence, the GAAR Advisory Panel and statutorily recognised guidance.
In determining abusiveness, reasonableness is something to be judged in the light of established practice. Thus the section provides explicitly that "the fact that tax arrangements accord with established practice, and HMRC had, at the time the arrangements were entered into, indicated its acceptance of that practice, is an example of something which might indicate that the arrangements are not abusive." 38 Generally guidance is not evidence as to the correct interpretation of the law. In the case of the GAAR Guidance, however, the guidance must be taken into account. It is still not binding and can be changed by HMRC and the Panel, but will be hard to counteract when it comes to the court deciding what was reasonable on the part of the taxpayer, so that it comes very close to attaining legislative weight.
The provision permitting the court to take into account statements of Ministers and other materials in addition to the Guidance is important and unusual in the UK. Generally there are severe restrictions on the extent to which reports and especially statements in Parliament are permitted to be taken into account, so this is a novel provision.
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In cases where HMRC seeks to apply the GAAR, the burden of proof will be squarely on HMRC to show that the tax arrangements are abusive. 40 Taking this together with the role of the Panel and the double reasonableness test, the legislation provides considerable safeguards against over-active use of the GAAR.
Disclosure rules and the GAAR
The UK has had extensive rules requiring disclosure of certain types of arrangement since 2004 well before it had a GAAR. 41 This Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes regime (DOTAS) can apply to arrangements that would not fall foul of the GAAR or indeed any anti-avoidance provisions, so it is not dependent on the GAAR in any way. DOTAS is seen as having been very successful and is unlikely to be narrowed to fit in with the GAAR criteria. 
GAAR and the Rule of Law
The UK has no written constitution, but this does not make the rule of law issues any less significant than they are elsewhere, though opportunities for challenge on this basis may be less obviously available. The question of whether the GAAR as drafted satisfies the rule of law has been widely discussed. The safeguards provided and discussed above have largely satisfied practitioners and business people, though some believe it is too uncertain. 43 Much will depend upon the way in which the Panel and courts apply and interpret the Act in the future.
Examples of application of the GAAR
With no cases decided or even brought to the Panel as yet, the only examples that can be provided are those set out in the Guidance. These have not yet been tested by the courts, but,
given that the court may take the Guidance into account, the examples are significant. 
In the circumstances the just and reasonable counteraction would be to treat the taxpayer as having entered into an arrangement with the scheme provider with no tax consequences (or as having entered into no arrangement)." 48
Which of these two counteraction approaches was used would depend ultimately on the court in all the circumstances. There are many further examples along the same lines, dealing with fact situations, whether the GAAR would apply and, if so, what the counteraction would be as will be discussed further below. adjustments. The adjustments to be made "are such as are just and reasonable". These adjustments can relate to the tax in question or any other tax to which the general anti-abuse rule applies. Any such adjustments have effect for all purposes.
Potentially this gives enormous discretion to revenue officials, but once again the GAAR Panel is intended to provide protection. 49 Only a designated HMRC officer can apply the GAAR in order to maintain a level of central control. Where such an officer considers that a tax advantage has arisen to a taxpayer from tax arrangements that are abusive, he or she can
give the taxpayer written notice that the advantage ought to be counteracted.
The notice must give full details of the counteraction that the officer considers ought to be taken, and may set out steps that the taxpayer may take to avoid the proposed counteraction.
The taxpayer then has 45 days to make written representations to the designated HMRC Where a counteraction is made there are requirements to set out the counteraction details and the taxpayer has the right, within 12 months of the counteraction becoming final, to make a claim for one or more consequential adjustments to be made in respect of any tax to which the general anti-abuse rule applies. HMRC is required to make such of the consequential adjustments claimed (if any) as are just and reasonable.
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The provisions are such as to make this a justiciable issue so that ultimately the decision will be for the courts. The wide wording has attracted some criticism, though there is more detailed guidance in Part C of the Guidance. Consequential adjustments may be made in respect of any period, and may affect any person (whether or not a party to the tax arrangements). They may not, however, increase any person's liability to tax.
Rulings
The UK does not have a comprehensive advance rulings system, although there are specific provisions for rulings in a few areas. It had been thought in earlier discussions on the GAAR in the UK that an advance rulings procedure would be an essential part of the introduction of a GAAR. 52 This was considered to be problematic for a variety of reasons. First there was the question of resource and cost. Even if taxpayers were required to pay for clearances, there would still be a need to devote highly trained and skilled revenue staff to the clearance procedure and HMRC felt it had better ways of using this scarce resource. Quite apart from 50 See J. Freedman (2013) supra n. 35. 51 S 201 FA 13. 52 This was a factor in rejection of the idea in 1998: see references to the debate supra n.15 the resource issue, clearances can be problematic in that they cause delay. Once they exist as a possibility, there is a tendency for taxpayers to apply for them whether they are needed or not as a kind of insurance policy.
The Aaronson Report argued that there was no need for clearances where the GAAR being introduced was a targeted one that did not apply to "the centre ground of responsible tax planning". This was accepted by the UK Government in implementing the proposed GAAR.
It should be noted that in the UK the largest businesses have HMRC "Customer Relationship
Managers" who would be able to discuss proposed transactions with them, and indeed would expect to do so as part of the co-operative compliance approach. This could be valuable in reducing any remaining uncertainty surrounding the GAAR in the commercial sphere, but at the same time there could be a concern that it might be unfair that large businesses have this facility available to them when others do not, so it is important that there are also other arrangements in place to give guidance; namely the extensive Guidance approved by the 
GAARs and SAARs (Special Anti-Avoidance Rules)
The UK has many specific anti-avoidance provisions (SAARS) and also what are known as targeted anti-avoidance provisions or TAARS. Prior to enactment of the GAAR, the TAARs were used as mini-GAARs and there are over 300 of them, with subtly different wording.
Many of them have extensive extra statutory guidance of their own because they are so widely drawn that in practice they need to be cut down. One hope in enacting the GAAR is that eventually some of the TAARs might be removed, but this seems unlikely until the Government is sure that the GAAR is being firmly applied by the courts.
In terms of the relationship between the GAAR and the SAARs and TAARs, the GAAR is an overriding legal rule. The Guidance makes clear the view that in principle the GAAR operates independently of SAARs and TAARs. Indeed the GAAR t might well be used to counteract an abusive arrangement which was itself contrived to exploit a defect in the other anti-avoidance rules, whether a TAAR or otherwise.
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The GAAR is also independent of the Ramsay principle, especially as it is said to be a principle of statutory construction. 54 In theory the substantive legislation will be applied first, as construed applying purposive interpretation, and then the GAAR if necessary. In practice it is expected that some of the stretched interpretation seen under the Ramsay approach can now been curtailed, given that the GAAR is available. Exactly how that will work out remains to be seen, however, and will depend both on how the parties approach litigation and the attitude of the courts.
GAARs and tax treaties
The GAAR, as an ordinary part of domestic law, is generally capable of applying in cases where a tax treaty is in place. The Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention, as amended in 2003, states that as a general rule there is no conflict between GAARs and tax treaties. 55 The tax treaty is applied, taking into account any adjustments made under the domestic GAAR.
The UK GAAR contains provisions to make clear that the GAAR can apply even where there is a tax treaty. The Guidance explains that where there are abusive arrangements which try to exploit particular provisions in a tax treaty, or the way in which such provisions interact with other provisions of UK tax law, then the GAAR can be applied to counteract the abusive arrangements. 56 Clearly this does not mean that the domestic GAAR can override tax treaties.
As the Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention points out, specific relieving provisions must still be observed and GAARs cannot undermine these. Thus, as the Guidance underlines, the mere fact that arrangements benefit from express rules on attribution of profits or allocation of taxing rights does not mean that the arrangements amount to abuse, and so the GAAR cannot be applied to them. It might be thought that this is so obvious as to need no reference in the Guidance, but the reference is a response to some commentators in the UK who appeared to suggest that a GAAR could be a solution to the issues around BEPS, which were beginning to attract attention at the time the Aaronson study group was concluding the report. The Guidance makes it clear that this is not intended to be, and indeed never could be, the role of a GAAR.
The relationship between the domestic GAAR and the anti-avoidance provisions in treaties will be handled in the same way and the relationship between the domestic GAAR and other domestic anti-avoidance provisions. Technically they are independent of each other.
This matter has now been discussed further as part of the BEPS project in the Public Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits 57 and the analysis and proposals there broadly support the analysis of the UK Guidance. In particular, the discussion draft makes the point that it is generally easier to conclude that the guiding principle in paragraph 9.5 of the Commentary on Art 1 of the Model OECD Treaty is met in the case of a GAAR that refers expressly to the purpose of entering into the transaction than in the case of specific anti-abuse rules that apply regardless of whether the transactions are tax motivated. The UK GAAR would appear to meet this motive test despite the motive test being objective rather than subjective.
GAARS and European Union law requirements (the Freedoms, directives)
The UK GAAR has been designed to apply only to direct taxes. VAT was not included in its scope because, as the Aaronson Report puts it, "this tax has its own anti-abuse rules derived from EU law, and applying a UK GAAR in parallel could raise issues of consistency with EU law". 58 Although some argued that the UK should adopt a GAAR along the lines of the abuse of law case law developed by the CJ, in order to avoid a multiplicity of rules, 59 this was considered too uncertain and wide an approach for UK domestic direct taxation. Should the 57 OECD, BEPS Action 6: Preventing the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances 14 th March -9 April 2014 available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/treaty-abuse-discussion-draft-march-2014.pdf (accessed 16/08/2014). 58 Aaronson Report para 1.9. 59 Eg Sinfield (2011) supra n 25.
UK GAAR apply in a cross border situation affected by EU case law, it seems likely that the relatively narrow and targeted approach of the UK GAAR would ensure that it would satisfy the requirements of Cadbury Schweppes, 60 and that it would be considered to apply only to "wholly artificial arrangements" even though that wording is not echoed in the drafting of the UK GAAR. The UK courts have shown themselves capable of reading principles of EU law into UK legislation in such a way as to ensure that it conforms to EU law where necessary. 61 All member states face similar problems in tackling abuse and there are great similarities amongst the attempts to deal with these, and between GAARS in different jurisdictions. The anti-abuse rules in each country may gradually converge, in part as a result of the influence of the jurisprudence of the CJ. There will always be a need, however, when applying national legislation, to look to the origins and objectives of that legislation, the national modes of drafting and rules of statutory interpretation, and so there are likely to be continuing differences between domestic GAARS. Total harmonisation seems unlikely in the foreseeable future.
approach was rejected by the Aaronson Report as too vague for the UK's own GAAR.
Whilst a harmonised GAAR appears to make some sense on the face of it, in relation to harmonised provisions, as explained in section 6, even with similar wording there will need to be differences in application to national provisions.
Where a common, harmonised provision is concerned then the issue is a different one. There is a case for an EU GAAR in such cases, but thought needs to be given to the wording to make it acceptable to member states. Reliance on some of the concepts still being evolved by the CJ will lead to a high level of references. There is a danger that, in the attempt to provide guidance and certainty, there will be pressure from references to the CJ to turn the principle into a set of detailed rules and this lack of flexibility could be unhelpful in controlling abuse.
8. Alternatives to GAARs
The UK does not have any substance over form or abuse of rights principles in its general law. 68 As discussed above, the UK GAAR will only apply if the usual rules on purposive interpretation fail to catch the abuse in question. As explained in part 1, however, there have been concerns that purposive interpretation is being stretched too far to deal with abuse, resulting in something approaching judge made legislation. This has created some uncertainty, especially around the extent of the so-called Ramsay principle or approach, and, if this approach is taken, there can be difficulties about the extent of the consequences and interaction with other provisions. If the GAAR applies, on the other hand, there are safeguards and guidance to deal with these matters.
Specific anti-avoidance provisions-SAARs and TAARs-exist in abundance in the UK tax system, but it is a mistake to consider that this reduces uncertainty. These provisions are often very wide in themselves and yet do not have the safeguards surrounding the GAAR. In an ideal world, the underlying legislation would be well drafted and based on clear principles so that fewer SAARs and TAARs and no GAAR would be needed. Adding more and more 66 See R. Lyal, Cadbury Schweppes and Abuse in De la Feria and Vogenauer ( 2011) supra n. 26. 67 As argued in Freedman (2011) supra n 26. 68 Supra n. 13.
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detail is not the answer-what is needed is better tax policy and clearer objectives, probably with a wider tax base and fewer tax reliefs. The experience of all the contributors to this book suggests that no jurisdiction has yet reached this exalted state of perfection and it seems unlikely that they will do so. 69 GAARs will be needed to contain the worst kind of abuse for the foreseeable future, but care needs to be taken to ensure that the discretion that a GAAR inevitably opens up is constrained by appropriate safeguards. Only time will tell whether the UK has achieved this necessary balance with its 2013 legislation.
69 See further J. Freedman Improving (Not Perfecting) Tax Legislation: Rules and Principles Revisited [2010] 
